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I. INTRODUCTION 
In some ways, a 2012 symposium on “Dilemmas of State Debt” 
may seem a bit behind the news curve. At the end of 2010, municipal 
bond markets were in a deep funk. Analysts predicted that countless 
municipalities and perhaps one or more of the United States might 
default on their debt obligations. Newspapers and the blogosphere 
teemed with comparisons to the ongoing disaster in the European 
Union—if Greece could default, why not California or Illinois? 
Several states toughened laws dealing with insolvent municipalities, 
and proposals to legislate a federal bankruptcy procedure for states 
received considerable attention.1 
What a difference a year seems to make. Greece and other 
members of the Euro Zone escaped disorderly default only by a 
series of improvised, increasingly desperate interventions by E.U. 
institutions and the International Monetary Fund, and no good end to 
the nightmare appears in sight. In the United States, by contrast, the 
crisis atmosphere has abated. The city of Vallejo, California, went 
through bankruptcy, and municipal authorities in Birmingham, 
Alabama, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Flint, Michigan, and a handful of 
 
* John G. Searle Scholar, American Enterprise Institute. Portions of this article are adapted 
from MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION (2012). I am indebted to Alex 
Pollock, the participants of the Duke Law symposium for helpful comments, and to Elizabeth 
DeMeo, David McDonald, and Cristina Mora for excellent research assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Give States a Way to Go Bankrupt: It’s the Best Option for 
Avoiding a Massive Federal Bailout, 3 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y, no. 2, 2011 at 1–5 (describing a 
possible state bankruptcy system); see also David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 2–3 (U. of 
Penn., Inst. for Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 11-24, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907774 (discussing a bankruptcy option for states); State and 
Municipal Debt: The Coming Crisis?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs. and 
Bailouts of Pub. and Private Programs, 112th Cong. (2011) (statements of Nicole Gelinas, David 
Skeel, Eileen Norcross, and Iris Lav) (regarding the possibility of restructuring state debt). 
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other places are in bankruptcy or state receivership,2 but the predicted 
financial collapse failed to materialize. Municipal bondholders 
registered solid gains in 2011.3 Many states are still in dire fiscal 
straits, and there is wide agreement that even a robust economic 
recovery cannot cure their long-term, structural deficits.4 In that sense, 
the crisis continues. The risks, however, do not seem acute or systemic. 
For example, it seems unlikely that a fiscal collapse of Illinois or even 
California—with an economy many times the size of Greece and an 
equally dysfunctional government—could wreak havoc of European 
magnitude. 
Even so, the strikingly different trajectories provide no cause for 
American “we-do-federalism-right” triumphalism. In the United 
States, as in Europe, subordinate governments are beset by 
unsustainable financial commitments. Those obligations differ in form 
and immediate urgency, but they share a common source: an inability 
on the part of the central government to maintain a credible 
commitment against bailing out spendthrift junior governments. That 
commitment was once the glory of American federalism. Over the 
past decade, however, the no-bailout commitment has effectively 
collapsed. Its demise entails fundamental changes in American 
federalism, none of them encouraging. 
After a brief account of the transatlantic differences (Part II), this 
article traces the history of the anti-bailout commitment in American 
federalism, including its origins (Part III), erosion (Part IV), and 
recent collapse, as exemplified by a seemingly unrelated object of 
agitation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Part V). It 
then compares American federalism’s emergent pathologies with 
Argentina’s, a federal system that exhibits them in full flourish (Part 
VI). The concluding part (Part VII) suggests that our political 
 
 2. Alan Farnham, Desperate U.S. Cities Include Vallejo, Calif., Harrisburg, Pa., Central 
Falls, R.I., ABC NEWS (Sept. 8, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/desperate-us-cities-
counties-file-bankruptcy/story?id=14464314#.T0eqJ4ePUR8; Sabrina Tavernise, City Council in 
Harrisburg Files Petition of Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/10/13/us/harrisburg-pennsylvania-files-for-bankruptcy.html. 
 3. Kelly Nolan, Muni Bonds: A Disaster That Wasn’t, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 23, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203686204577114803651535024.html. 
 4. Robert G. Ward, State Revenues in an Era of Fundamental Change, ROCKEFELLER 
INST. (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/government_finance/2011-12-02-state_ 
revenues_ppt.pdf; see generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-495SP, STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ FISCAL OUTLOOK (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new. 
items/d11495sp.pdf (describing the growing long-term fiscal challenges of state and local 
governments). 
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institutions may no longer possess the capacity to reform our 
dysfunctional federalism in any meaningful way. 
II. OTHER PEOPLE’S PROBLEMS, AND OURS 
Start with an iron law of federalism: a system of centralized 
monetary and tax authority, coupled with decentralized borrowing 
and spending authority, is a prescription for moral hazard—that is, 
local over-spending and over-borrowing on the central government’s 
credit in the hope or expectation of a federal bailout. Federal systems 
have coped with this menace more or less well, through a variety of 
techniques and institutions.5 But in the end, only two principal 
strategies are available: (1) restrict local governments’ spending and 
borrowing authority (as the European Union is now attempting to 
do), or (2) establish and maintain a credible pre-commitment against 
bailouts. 
The ability to maintain a commitment against bailouts depends on 
a number of factors. Just saying so, or even writing a prohibition 
against bailouts (as in the E.U. Treaties),6 is not enough; the central 
government must prove the commitment at least once, by letting a 
state go belly-up.7 That accomplished, the commitment must be made 
to last. It is a lot like virginity: one slip and it is gone for good. This 
dynamic operates always and everywhere. However, central 
governments’ ability to pre-commit also depends on the structure of 
the subordinate governments’ obligations and of the financial 
markets.8 These factors go a long way toward explaining the recent, 
disparate developments in the European Union and the United 
States. 
A. State Obligations 
Unlike Greece and many other E.U. countries, states operate 
(with only one exception) under balanced-budget requirements.9 
 
 5. See generally Jonathan Rodden, Federalism, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY (Barry Weingast & Donald Wittman eds., 2006) (explaining the various structures 
and incentives created to minimize opportunism on the part of local politicians). 
 6. Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 125, 2010 O.J. (C 
83/99) (ex 103 TEC) (prohibition against bailouts). 
 7. See generally JONATHAN RODDEN, HAMILTON’S PARADOX: THE PROMISE AND PERIL 
OF FISCAL FEDERALISM (2006) (analyzing the relationship between decentralization, 
federalism, and fiscal discipline). 
 8. Id. at 50. 
 9. See NCSL Fiscal Brief: State Balanced Budget Provisions, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE 
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Admittedly, their budgets have been subject to much gimmickry and 
manipulation, and balanced-budget requirements have been enforced 
with varying degrees of stringency.10 Still, the requirements have 
prevented massive annual deficits on the scale of Greece, or for that 
matter the U.S. government, which tend to alarm the public and the 
markets, in turn prompting central interventions. This does not mean 
that states have avoided fiscal excess, only that the excess shows up in 
off-budget forms and places—bond obligations, and above all pension 
systems. For the time being, those debts seem manageable: bond debt 
can be rolled over (albeit at higher rates), and with the exception of a 
few states (such as Illinois), underfunded pension systems will not 
require back-breaking budget infusions for some years.11 In the 
interim, state and local governments can do many things to address 
long-term problems or, more often, to muddle through: reforming 
pension systems,12 paying contractors in scrip,13 shortening school 
years, closing prisons and parks, or leaving roads unrepaired.14 
 
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudget 
Provisions2010.pdf. (outlining states’ balanced-budget requirements). The exception is 
Vermont. For more information on state budget requirements, see State Balanced Budget 
Requirements Executive Summary, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 12, 
1999), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/budget/state-balanced-budget-requirements.aspx.  
 10. Henning Bohn & Robert P. Inman, Balanced Budget Rules and Public Deficits: 
Evidence from the U.S. States, (Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy NBER, 
Working Paper No. 5533, 1996). 
 11. See Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, The Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored 
Pension Plans, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 191–210 (2009) [hereinafter Liabilities] (discussing the 
underfunding of state pension plans); see also Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, Public 
Pension Promises: How Big Are They and What Are They Worth? 66 J. FINANCE 1211, 1211–49 
(2011) [hereinafter Promises] (discussing accurate calculation methods of public pension funds). 
 12. See Paul Burton, Rhode Island Makes Reform Happen, THE BOND BUYER (Dec. 14, 
2011), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/120_239/rhode-island-pension-1034196-1.html 
(examining Rhode Island’s efforts to reform its pension system). 
 13. See Stu Woo, California Faces Prospect of Issuing IOUs Again, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704557704575438072401098874.html 
(discussing California potentially having to pay its bills in the form of IOUs); see also Emily D. 
Johnson & Ernest A. Young, The Constitutional Law of State Debt, 7 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & 
PUB. POL’Y 117 (2012) (analyzing the current fiscal challenges of various state governments). 
 14. See Louis Freedberg & Sue Frey, California Budget Shortfall Heightens Threat of 
Shorter School Year, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/11/17/california-budget-shortfa_n_1100194.html (describing the likelihood of California 
shortening its school year to save money); see also Monique Garcia, Quinn Plans Layoffs, 
Facility Closings, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, (Sep. 6, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-09-
06/news/ct-met-pat-quinn-illinois-budget-20110906_1_quinn-plans-major-state-employees-
union-pat-quinn (discussing Illinois’s cuts to social services in response to its budget shortfalls); 
Nicholas Johnson et al., An Update on State Budget Cuts, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1214 (detailing 
budget cuts implemented in forty-six states). 
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America’s crumbling infrastructure is a telling sign of fiscal distress 
and political dysfunction,15 but not the sort of thing that would trouble 
the credit markets. 
B. Financial Markets 
Before the financial crisis, the wizards who run the world’s banks 
priced Greek debt on par with German debt, on the theory (if that is 
the right word) that because both countries shared a common 
currency, the values of their bonds should rise and fall together.16 All 
U.S. states and municipalities, of course, share a common currency; 
and yet, the markets are perfectly capable of distinguishing between 
Illinois bonds and Virginia bonds. Borrowing on someone else’s cheap 
credit is what got Greece, Italy, and eventually the European Union 
into trouble. It is not an option for California or Illinois. Likewise, the 
contagion that spread through Europe seems less of a risk stateside.17 
This is perplexing: one would think that the United States would feel 
more responsible for the financial fate of one of its members, and thus 
more bailout-prone, than the European Union.18 
The most likely answer to the puzzle has to do with the structure 
of the debt market.19 Big banks hold most European sovereign debt. 
International capital requirements and accounting standards 
encourage those banks to load up on supposedly “risk-free” 
government bonds.20 In addition, governments may resort to “financial 
repression” and force the banks to take on additional sovereign debt. 
And it is the banks—not their sovereign debtors—that are being 
 
 15. See Gene Nichol, State Budget Challenges and the Scourge of Poverty, 7 DUKE J. 
CONST. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 71 (2012) (describing the wide-ranging consequences of state budget 
cuts). 
 16. Ferry Batzoglou et al., The Ticking Euro Bomb: How a Good Idea Became a Tragedy, 
SPIEGEL (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,790138,00.html. 
 17. See generally Rabah Arezki, Bertrand Candelon & Amadou N.R. Sy, Are There 
Spillover Effects from Munis? (IMF Working Paper 11/290, 2011) (finding negative spillovers in 
U.S. municipal bond markets). 
 18. Randall C. Henning & Martin Kressler, Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of 
Europe’s Fiscal Union, BRUEGEL (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.bruegel.org/publications/ 
publication-detail/publication/669-fiscal-federalism-us-history-for-architects-of-europes-fiscal-
union/. 
 19. See Andrew Ang & Francis A. Longstaff, Systemic Sovereign Credit Risk: Lessons from 
the U.S. and Europe, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16982.pdf?new_window=1 (arguing that systemic sovereign risk 
has its roots in financial markets). 
 20. Peter J. Wallison, How Regulators Herded Banks into Trouble, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203833104577069911633739768.html. 
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bailed out in Europe. Should one of them become insolvent, it might 
take the entire financial system along for a brutal ride. 
State banks that serve as a source of cheap credit for their 
governments have been a chronic problem for many federal systems, 
such as Brazil (which shut down many state banks a decade ago) and 
Argentina.21 If California had a bank loaded up with the state’s debt, 
the United States might be in Europe’s position. Mercifully, however, 
only one of the United States, North Dakota, has such a bank.22 
Overwhelmingly, state and municipal obligations are owed to 
bondholders and pension funds. If those debts go bad, bondholders 
and retirees—and probably some funds with big bets on the wrong 
side of the market—will have to take a haircut. That is unfortunate, 
but it is not a threat to the financial system. To state the crucial 
difference: when debts (sovereign or private) are owed to and re-
leveraged by big, “systemically important” financial institutions, no 
central government can credibly pre-commit to a no-bailout policy. In 
contrast, where debts are owed to dispersed (and mostly domestic) 
bondholders and retirees, the central government can at least keep 
creditors and would-be lenders guessing. 
So, no, California is not Greece. Still, not all is in good order with 
American federalism and its fiscal condition. Moral hazard and 
opportunistic behavior on the part of state and local governments are 
serious and growing problems. First, as already noted, states and local 
governments have parked their unsustainable financial commitments 
in their pension and retirement systems. Unfunded pension 
obligations are estimated to amount to upwards of three and perhaps 
more than four trillion dollars.23 In addition, state and local 
 
 21. See RODDEN, supra note 7, at 208 (analyzing the relationship between decentralization, 
federalism, and fiscal discipline); see also Jennifer L. Rich, A Startling Bank Privatization in 
Brazil, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/21/business/a-startling-
bank-privatization-in-brazil.html?ref=brazil (discussing Santander’s purchase of formerly state-
owned Banco do Estado de Sao Paulo in Brazil); Mariano Tommasi, Sebastian Saiegh & Pablo 
Sanguinetti, Fiscal Federalism in Argentina: Policies, Politics, and Institutional Reform, 
ECONOMIA 147, 154 (2001) (describing the inefficiencies of Argentina’s system of fiscal 
federalism). 
 22. See BANK OF NORTH DAKOTA, http://banknd.nd.gov (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) 
(describing the Bank of North Dakota as “the only state-owned bank in the nation”). 
 23.  See Liabilities, supra note 11, at 191–210 (estimating unfunded obligations at $3.23 
trillion); Promises, supra note 11, at 1207–45 (estimating unfunded obligations at between $3.2 
trillion and $4.43 trillion); see also Joshua Rauh, The Economics of State and Local Government 
Finance, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA PUB. AFFAIRS FORUM (Oct. 26, 2011), 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/news/multimedia/111130_paforum_rauh_transcript.cfm (estimating 
unfunded liabilities at “around $4 trillion”). 
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governments owe other post-employment benefits, mostly in the form 
of health benefits, to retirees. These obligations run north of a half-
trillion dollars and are almost entirely unfunded.24 Eventually, all 
those debts will come due. Second, while we have been spared one 
risk that contributed to the E.U. nightmare (big banks loaded with 
sovereign debt), we confront an institutional threat that the E.U. does 
not—a federal transfer union that combines central tax authority with 
local spending and borrowing authority. In many such unions, junior 
governments rack up unsustainable debts and central governments 
bail them out in one form or another. 
The United States has begun to do likewise. The legislative means 
(described later in this article) have been partial, indirect, and 
subterranean. However, they have already compromised American 
federalism’s most salutary and exceptional feature—a centuries-old 
federal commitment against bailouts. 
III. THE COMMITMENT AGAINST BAILOUTS 
The European Union’s Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties contain 
prohibitions against bailouts of member-states by central authorities 
or sister-states.25 The United States Constitution does not. In fact, the 
Constitution seems horridly deficient in stemming the bailout peril. 
Nothing bars states from borrowing themselves into ruin (although 
they must pay their debts in real money26). Nothing authorizes the U.S. 
government to restrict the fiscal authority of even the most reckless 
state government.27 And nothing bars the federal government from 
paying the states’ debts, sua sponte or upon the states’ request.28 Thus, 
the stage seems set for irresponsible state bets on federal assistance. 
The scenario seems particularly likely because constitutional 
government in the United States started with a bailout—to wit, the 
 
 24. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-899, FISCAL PRESSURES COULD 
HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE DELIVERY OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMS 31–32 
(2010). 
 25. Treaty on European Union, art. 103, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 ILM 247; Treaty of Lisbon, art. 
123, Dec. 13, 2007, 2008 O.J. (C115) 1. 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 27. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton), available at http://oll.libertyfund. 
org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=788&chapter=108621&layout=html&It
emid=27 (justifying state control over state taxing and spending). 
 28. The narrow exception is Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that 
“neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in 
aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. 
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assumption of the states’ Revolutionary War debts.29 With that 
(arguable) exception, however, the United States has never bailed out 
a state—and not for lack of opportunity or demand. Experts have 
attributed this remarkable phenomenon to the federal government’s 
“drop dead” stance in the first serious test in the years between 1837 
and 1843.30 
A. The Panic of 1837 
In the Antebellum Era, states competed aggressively in providing 
infrastructure, such as roads, harbors, and especially canals. While 
some funded projects through benefit taxation, others used a system 
of tax-free finance—state-chartered banks and internal improvement 
corporations sold debt instruments, very often to European investors. 
Those schemes sailed into trouble after a sharp deflation (a “panic,” 
as it was then called) in 1837.31 Some states, especially in the West, 
responded with yet more aggressive borrowing. The game was up in 
1840, when banks collapsed and the bottom dropped out of the 
speculative land market that had supported the borrowing spree. In 
1841–42, several states defaulted. 
Plans for a federal bailout surfaced in 1839, well before the crisis 
had hit with full force. In 1843, after years of debate, a congressional 
committee submitted a report and proposal for federal debt 
assumption. The committee emphasized the dearth of state funds and 
available revenue sources and the danger that state defaults would 
halt the construction of projects that, though state-initiated, were of 
national, interstate importance.32 To those arguments, one could have 
added others. British and Dutch investors pressured the United States 
government for intervention, arguing (probably with some justice) 
that they had extended funds in reliance on the credit of the United 
States. In 1842, the United States was entirely cut off from 
international credit. Even so, and even though the federal government 
possessed ample tariff revenues to bankroll the states, no bailout 
 
 29. RODDEN, supra note 7, at 56–57. 
 30. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 18, at 10–13 (discussing Congress’s refusal to pay state 
debts in the 1840s). 
 31. For a concise account of the crisis and its resolution, see RODDEN, supra note 7, at 58–
64. 
 32. It also cited historical (albeit somewhat dubious) precedents. For example, the federal 
government had reimbursed states for expenditures incurred in the War of 1812, and a few 
federal subscriptions to the stock of state improvement corporations could, with some 
stretching, be characterized as debt relief. See RODDEN, supra note 7, at 58. 
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materialized. The committee’s proposal was never even put to a vote 
in Congress. Lenders at home and abroad took the losses, but the 
credit markets soon resumed their operation. (They always do.) 
Scholars generally credit two subsequent developments to the 1837–
43 experience: the adoption by many states of constitutional 
prohibitions against tax-free finance, and a firm expectation among 
investors and politicians that the federal government will refuse 
bailout demands. 
B. Structure and Sectionalism 
Why did the political system hold firm in 1837–43? Two factors 
played a central role: (1) the constitutional structure, and (2) political 
sectionalism. 
As noted, the Constitution contains no prohibition against federal 
bailouts or fiscal transfers. However, in contrast to most modern 
federal constitutions, it also contains no “fiscal constitution”—that is, 
no mandate for the distribution of federal tax receipts to subordinate 
governments and no distributive baseline (and, as noted, no general 
supervisory authority over the states’ taxing, spending, and borrowing 
decisions).33 In the years between 1837 and 1843, “[t]hese limitations 
clearly bolstered the credibility of the [federal government’s] 
commitment to stay out of the states’ budget difficulties.”34 The lack of 
a baseline deprived would-be debt relievers of a focal point and, 
hence, prevented them from bargaining toward a political consensus. 
The assumption debate was not about what distribution would be 
“fair” relative to a known baseline; it was about what the appropriate 
distribution baseline ought to be. Especially for an institutional 
system that demands considerably more than a simple majority in a 
single political body for purposes of legislation, that is usually too 
much to handle. 
It is certainly too much to handle when states are highly 
heterogeneous or riven by a deep sectional divide. Again, the lessons 
of 1843 are instructive. The congressional committee proposed to 
distribute federal funds in proportion to state population. It is hard to 
see how that solution could have generated a consensus. The 
prospective payments bore no relation to individual state debt levels, 
 
 33. See generally Kenneth W. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 
271 (1977) (discussing and comparing Germany’s Basic Law). 
 34. RODDEN, supra note 7, at 66. 
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let alone national interests (such as the severity of interstate 
spillovers) or the degree of political culpability and corruption that 
had produced individual states’ fiscal crises. And behind those 
difficulties lurked the deeper, sectional problem. The “distribution in 
proportion to population” proposal had no constitutional warrant, but 
at least a reference point: the apportionment formula for direct 
taxes.35 This, though, raised the highly explosive slavery issue.36 Small 
wonder that bailout plans were dead on arrival. 
IV. FAREWELL, MY LOVELY: FROM COMMITMENT TO THE 
TRANSFER STATE 
The 1837–43 experience illustrates the genius of our constitutional 
arrangements—but also, albeit indirectly, their fragility. The 
constitutional baseline is what Madison called the “compound 
republic” and what later generations would call “dual federalism:”37 
bilateral (fiscal) autonomy for states and the federal government; no 
provision for federal transfers; no federal superintendence over state 
affairs. Those constitutional entitlements are the strength of the 
system. Their weakness is that governments may bargain around 
them. In particular, states may surrender their autonomy in exchange 
for federal transfer payments, and Congress may induce them to do 
so. These arrangements are commonly subsumed under the heading 
of “cooperative federalism.”38 They were virtually unknown during the 
Nineteenth Century, for the same reasons that blocked federal 
bailouts.39 However, after a few limited and often temporary 
experiments with such programs during the Progressive era, the New 
Deal institutionalized them on a grand scale and on a permanent 
basis. 
How and why did this happen? As noted, the commitment against 
bailouts sprang from two sources: the lack of a constitutional baseline 
 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
 36. It appears that the committee proposed to adhere to the three-fifths formula for 
counting slaves. RODDEN, supra note 7, at 62. 
 37. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/ 
?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=788&chapter=108635&layout=html&Itemi
d=27 (discussing the compound republic); Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 
36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1950) (explaining the concept of “dual federalism”). 
 38. Invention of the term is generally credited to Edward S. Corwin. See generally 
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT (1934). 
 39. See MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 161–67 (2012), for a brief 
discussion and references. 
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and focal point for state bargaining, and political sectionalism. 
However, institutional players that are locked into a repeat game will 
eventually find a cooperative solution,40 and the unusual conditions of 
the New Deal period—economic and social crisis, and an 
extraordinary degree of partisan consensus—facilitated that 
solution.41 Sectionalism, while greatly weakened, remained sufficiently 
potent to block transfer programs in policy domains where federal 
involvement would have posed a direct threat to the racial caste 
structure in the South.42 In most other venues, however, from poverty 
relief to unemployment insurance to infrastructure, the New Deal 
found funding formulas and institutional techniques (such as highly 
discretionary administrative programs) to overcome once-effective 
obstacles to “cooperative” transfer programs.43 The remaining 
obstacles were eventually overcome in the 1960s, with the creation of 
federal education programs and Medicaid under the Great Society. 
Cooperative transfer programs have four effects, well-recognized 
in a voluminous “fiscal federalism” literature, that bear on the 
commitment against bailouts, state and local indebtedness, and the 
fiscal and institutional future of our federalism. First, transfer 
programs inflate the demand for government at all levels (national, 
state, and local). Second, they support local political elites and their 
clientele, especially public-sector unions. Third, they produce acute 
moral hazard—that is, state and local overspending and gambling on a 
federal bailout. Fourth, they have potent self-reinforcing tendencies. 
The chart below illustrates some of those effects. 
 
 
 
 40. Game theorists call this well-established proposition the “folk theorem” because 
nobody seems to have discovered it first. See Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, The Folk 
Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information, 54 
ECONOMETRICA 533 (1986) (describing the “folk theorem”). 
 41. See Jenna Bednar, William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Political Theory of 
Federalism, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRATIC RULE 223 (John Ferejohn et al. 
eds., 2001), for a similar account. 
 42. See generally FRANK J. MUNGER & RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., NATIONAL POLITICS AND 
FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION (1962) (identifying education as the primary example of 
sectionalism’s constraints on transfer programs). 
 43. RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, SECTIONALISM AND AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT, 1880–1980, 175–255 (1984). Bensel emphasizes two institutional factors that 
stabilized the system: a congressional committee system that was able (until the 1960s) to bottle 
up legislation that might have broken the bipolar New Deal coalition, and an administrative 
apparatus with discretionary means and budgetary resources to negotiate sectional (and thus 
political, intraparty) conflicts. 
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Chart taken from THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION44 
A. More Government 
Transfer programs inflate the demand for government by reducing 
its perceived cost.45Almost certainly, this fiscal illusion has driven the 
 
 44. GREVE, supra note 39, at 273. 
 45. Suppose that state taxpayers would refuse to pay $100 for some redistributive program. 
Then suppose that the federal government offers to chip in $50 for every $50 spent by the state 
on that same program: taxpayers may well support the scheme, failing to recognize that the 
federal government’s share is also their tax responsibility. 
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growth of government in the United States. From the end of the 
Korean War to the 2008–09 financial crisis, federal revenue as a 
percentage of gross domestic product hovered within a narrow 
eighteen to twenty percent range. The state and local share, in 
contrast, rose from roughly six percent (not shown in the chart) to 
almost fifteen percent. In fiscal terms, the growth of government over 
the past half century is principally attributable to the growth of state 
and local government. 
B.  E Pluribus Unions 
Cooperative federalism and transfer programs respond to the 
national-level weakness of redistributive coalitions in American 
politics. Because direct redistribution often encounters public 
resistance, politicians either disguise programs as a form of (middle-
class) self-insurance, as with Social Security or Medicare, or else 
mobilize state governments, bureaucracies, and their clientele in 
support. Education programs support educators (and children only 
secondarily); Medicaid supports providers; and so on. Economists 
estimate the ratio of this diversion or “flypaper effect”—the money 
sticks where it hits—at somewhere between 0.3 and 1.0.46 
C. Moral Hazard 
Over time, federal transfer programs increase moral hazard. In 
large measure, this is a function of state and local officials’ constricted 
time horizon. Officeholders aggressively seek federal funding—a 
benefit that accrues during their expected tenure in office—even if 
the long-term fiscal consequences for the state are known to be 
ruinous. The perceived benefits (transfers) have electoral 
consequences; the real long-term costs generally do not.47 
D. Self-Enforcement 
Transfer programs are self-enforcing in that no institutional player 
can defect without making itself worse off. No state can opt out 
without leaving its taxpayers’ proportional contribution to the 
federally financed program on the table; and the more generous the 
federal program, the more difficult a state will find it to replace 
 
 46. Robert P. Inman, The Flypaper Effect 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 14579, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1320825. 
 47. See infra Part VII.B for a discussion of the possible limiting condition, an acute 
recognition among voters that debt levels have become unsustainable. 
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federal dollars with other revenues. Moreover, potent local 
bureaucracies and political constituencies (such as public-sector 
unions or healthcare providers) typically support transfer programs, 
creating an additional lock-in effect.48 Federal legislators, for their 
part, generally prefer a “cooperative” transfer program to the 
alternatives of either wholesale nationalization or federal repeal.49 
Over time, transfer programs drive up local taxing and spending. 
They crowd out unfunded programs—that is to say, things that state 
and local governments have to pay for from own-source revenues. 
(This is why Medicaid, the most generous federal program, has come 
to consume over twenty percent of the states’ budgets.50) When state 
revenues hit a wall, local programs have been cut to the bone. 
Federally funded programs cannot be cut without leaving money on 
the table, so states hide the shortfalls off-budget by underfunding 
their pension programs. “Cooperative federalism” creates this 
dynamic. How does it respond to its own self-destructive tendencies? 
The decline in federal outlays to states during the “Reagan 
Revolution,” shaded in gray in the chart above and briefly discussed 
below, suggests that cooperative federalism may be capable of reform 
and retrenchment. Note, though, that cooperative federalism quickly 
emerged from the Reagan era and resumed its upward march. The 
ascent is marked by increasingly desperate measures to shore up a 
dysfunctional system. 
The first response to the transfer state’s nasty state-level fiscal 
effects is to make federal programs more generous. Between the end 
of the Second World War and 1980, that strategy was made possible 
by inflation;51 in the 1990s, by the dissipation of the “peace dividend”; 
and since then, by accumulating federal debt. For reasons mentioned, 
however, rolling debt relief only exacerbates the states’ fiscal travails. 
The next move is to enact partial, de facto bailouts under different 
 
 48. This is a common explanation for the asymmetrical effect of federal transfer programs. 
See generally SHAMA GAMKHAR, FEDERAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANTS AND THE STATES: 
MANAGING DEVOLUTION (Edward Elgar Publ’g Ltd. ed., 2002) (extensively discussing the 
additional lock-in effect of federal transfer programs). 
 49. This generalization holds true regardless of federal legislators’ ideology or partisan 
affiliation. 
 50. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 
EXAMINING FISCAL 2009–2011 STATE SPENDING 3 (2011), available at http://www.nasbo.org 
/sites/default/files/2010%20State%20Expenditure%20Report.pdf. 
 51. John J. Wallis, The Political Economy of New Deal Fiscal Federalism, 29 ECON. 
INQUIRY 510, 524 (1991), available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/200985434. 
(8) GREVE (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2012  12:22 PM 
2012] OUR FEDERALISM IS NOT EUROPE’S. 31 
names. 
The political landscape is littered with such measures, even if their 
true nature is rarely acknowledged. Unsurprisingly, some bailout 
measures were temporary responses to the financial crisis that began 
in 2008. For example, the federal government created Build America 
Bonds, effectively subsidizing well north of $78 billion in newly issued 
municipal bonds by paying thirty-five percent of the interest.52 For 
another example, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA), better known as the 2009 “Stimulus” bill, provided some 
$223 billion to state and local governments. Roughly half of the 
amount was dedicated to program- and project-specific transfers, 
principally for the purpose of propping up the government 
employment market.53 
With some effort, one can describe these programs as anti-cyclical 
macro-economic initiatives rather than bailouts. Consistent with that 
riff, some programs have been discontinued as the economy has 
recovered sufficient breath to fog a mirror. Build America Bonds 
were allowed to expire at the end of 2010. A temporary increase in 
Medicaid’s Federal Medical Assistance Percentages (FMAP), 
originally contained in ARRA, was extended until July 2011 when it, 
too, was allowed to expire. Still, ARRA’s dominant effect was to close 
state budget gaps;54 and in any event, de facto bailouts long predate 
the financial crisis. 
Predictably, those measures were concentrated in Medicaid, the 
biggest and most generous transfer program and, consequently, the 
chief contributor to the states’ fiscal woes. Under the Clinton 
administration, for example, Congress enacted a children’s health 
insurance program (CHIP) that, while principally intended to provide 
insurance to uninsured children, also provided states with the 
opportunity—and a powerful incentive—to reassign Medicaid-
covered children from that overburdened program into the more 
generously funded CHIP program. More recently, Congress enacted 
the already mentioned FMAP increases. Those measures, however, 
pale in comparison to the biggest bailout measure to date—the 2011 
 
 52. Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Build America Pays Off on Wall Street, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704869304575104101463410466.html. 
 53. Robert P. Inman, States in Fiscal Distress, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, 6 
REGIONAL ECON. DEV. 65, 66 (2010), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/ 
red/2010/01/Inman.pdf. 
 54. Id. 
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
V. A CASE STUDY IN FEDERALISM ADJUSTMENT: THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
By any measure, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA)55 is the most consequential and controversial piece of 
legislation enacted in several decades. It also constitutes a major 
federalism adjustment: it builds on cooperative federalism’s most 
dysfunctional features, and doubles down. 
The ACA’s crucial federalism innovation is not the much-
maligned, intensely litigated “individual mandate”—that is, the 
provision that uninsured individuals, beginning in 2014, must either 
purchase health insurance or else pay a fiscal penalty.56 Regardless of 
the individual mandate’s fate in the Supreme Court, two other parts 
of the ACA will have far greater effects on the healthcare and health-
insurance systems and, more broadly, on American federalism. One of 
them is a massive expansion of Medicaid;57 the other, the 
establishment of state-run health-insurance “exchanges” for 
individuals and small businesses.58 
Originally enacted in 1965, Medicaid is a “cooperative” federal-
state program. If a state agrees to provide medical services for certain 
populations, the federal government reimburses between fifty and 
eighty-three cents of each dollar spent on the service.59 The match, or 
FMAP, depends on the state’s wealth, with poor states receiving 
higher matches. For participating states, coverage of certain 
populations and services is mandatory. However, states may 
voluntarily cover additional populations and services. All have done 
so to varying degrees. The ACA builds on this regime. Beginning in 
2014, it requires participating states to cover all individuals up to 
 
 55. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified in scattered titles of 21, 25, 26, 29 and 42 of the United States Code) [hereinafter 
ACA]. 
 56. Id. § 1311, 124 Stat. at 173–81. 
 57. See id. § 2001–2955 (expanding Medicaid coverage as well as other programs). 
 58. See id. § 1311(a), 124 Stat. at 173 (establishing health-insurance exchanges). 
 59. MEDICAID AND CHIP PAYMENT AND ACCESS COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 
ON MEDICAID AND CHIP 38 (Mar. 2011), available at https://a7d050c2-a-10078ef1-s-
sites.googlegroups.com/a/macpac.gov/macpac/reports/MACPAC_March2011_web.pdf. For a 
general overview of Medicaid’s history and recent developments, see U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF RET. AND DISABILITY POLICY, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 2011 56 (2011), 
available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/ docs/statcomps/supplement/2011/supplement11.pdf. 
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133% of the federal poverty line.60 The expanded program is expected 
to provide health coverage for an additional sixteen million poor and 
near-poor—heretofore uninsured—individuals at a cost of upwards of 
$500 billion between 2014 and 2019.61 
For uninsured individuals outside Medicaid’s ambit and for small 
businesses, the ACA envisions the establishment of state-run, 
federally superintended “health benefit exchanges.”62 (In states that 
fail to establish such exchanges, the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) will do so directly.63) The federal government 
will provide substantial subsidies for insurance obtained through—
but not outside—an exchange. The exchanges are also the vehicles 
through which the ACA’s complicated requirements concerning 
coverage, reimbursement rates, and the like will be enforced. 
For present purposes, two features of the ACA’s convoluted 
architecture merit attention. First, the Medicaid provisions are the 
latest and biggest step in a series of rolling bailouts. The federal 
government will pay 100% of the costs for the “new eligibles.”64 The 
ratio will gradually decline to ninety-three percent by 2019.65 Even so, 
the ACA will add at most two or three percent to the Medicaid costs 
that the states would have incurred in any event.66 For most states, 
moreover, the ACA translates into a substantial increase of the 
average FMAP. Texas, for example, will see its match increase from 
roughly sixty to seventy percent.67 
Second, the ACA—once it is fully operational—will allow states to 
transfer hundreds of thousands of current and former employees and 
their healthcare expenses from state-funded programs either into 
 
 60. ACA § 2001, 124 Stat. at 271. 
 61. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICARE MANAGED CARE: 
KEY DATA, TRENDS AND ISSUES (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8046-
02.pdf. 
 62. ACA § 1311(a), 124 Stat. at 173. 
 63. Id. § 1321. 
 64. Id. § 2001(a)(3). 
 65. Id. 
 66. JOHN HOLAHAN & IRENE HEADEN, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE 
UNINSURED, MEDICAID COVERAGE AND SPENDING IN HEALTH REFORM: NATIONAL AND 
STATE BY STATE RESULTS FOR ADULTS AT OR BELOW 133% FPL 6 (2010), available at 
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/Medicaid-Coverage-and-Spending-in-Health-Reform-
National-and-State-By-State-Results-for-Adults-at-or-Below-133-FPL.pdf. 
 67. EVELYN P. BAUMRUCKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32950, MEDICAID: THE 
FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGE (FMAP) 16 (2010), available at 
http://aging.senate.gov/crs/medicaid6.pdf. 
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Medicaid or into the health-benefit exchanges.68 The magnitude of this 
effect is impossible to predict. It is largely a function of HHS’s 
implementation of the ACA, which is now and forever shall be a 
poorly constrained work in progress. One can safely predict, however, 
that state politicians and bureaucracies will lobby aggressively for 
transfer-facilitating regulations. HHS will be hospitable to their 
entreaties; it needs the states, both to provide political support for the 
implementation of the program and to make the unwieldy exchanges 
work. 
Like much of the ACA, a large-scale federal takeover of state and 
local obligations incurred in peacetime would be unprecedented in 
U.S. history. Other federal systems, however, have resorted to such 
measures. Once proud and productive Argentina provides a 
particularly apt comparison. 
VI. WELCOME TO ARGENTINA? 
Like the United States, Argentina is a presidential, federal, and 
bicameral system. It features a large number of states (provinces) and 
a powerful, poorly apportioned upper house (the Senate).69 Its 
Nineteenth-Century constitution is modeled on the U.S. Constitution 
and, prior to 1994 amendments that, in atonement for the country’s 
authoritarian sins, domesticated the international non-governmental-
organization agenda (e.g., the protection of women during lactation),70 
resembled ours in often striking detail. Argentina’s federalism, like 
ours, was profoundly “dual” until the mid-Twentieth Century when it 
succumbed, like ours, to a “cooperative” mode of operation.71 
Argentina has since become something of a poster child for fiscal 
federalism’s dysfunctions.72 Provinces gamble on federal bailouts; go 
bust; are taken over by federal officials; and, following a brief 
interregnum, promptly revert to their exploitative form. 
 
 68. Philip Bredesen, Obamacare’s Incentive to Drop Insurance, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304510704575562643804015252.html. 
 69. For a brief overview of Argentina’s government, see Antonio M. Hernandez, Republic 
of Argentina, LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE IN FEDERAL 
COUNTRIES 8 (Katy le Roy & Cheryl Saunders eds., 2006), available at 
http://www.federalism.ch/files/categories/IntensivkursII/Argentinag3.pdf. 
 70. See CONSTITUCION NACIONAL DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA art. 75, § 23, available 
at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Argentina/argen94.html (protecting human rights, 
especially of children, women, the aged, and the disabled). 
 71. Hernandez, supra note 69, at 2. 
 72. Tommasi et al., supra note 21, at 157. 
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To be sure, the differences between Argentina’s federalism and 
ours remain stark and meaningful. One difference is economic: 
Argentina, a century ago among the richest, most developed nations, 
has since suffered long-term decline, broken by intermittent, often 
hectic and inflationary, growth spurts.73 A second difference is 
Argentina’s political instability. The country’s periodic lurches into 
authoritarianism and insolvency are closely connected to a federalism 
that has produced overspending, opportunistic subnational “rentier 
states,” and a central government unable to stem subordinate 
governments’ recklessness.74 
Occasional suggestions to the effect that America is approaching 
that sort of political predicament75 probably have more to do with the 
air in New Haven than with any basis in fact. Quite arguably, however, 
American federalism has begun to develop some of the fiscal and 
institutional dysfunctions on full display in Argentina. Two are 
particularly suggestive: the emergence of an “executive federalism,” 
and federal bailouts embodied in pension reform. 
A. Executive Federalism 
In the 1930s, Argentina’s provinces did what American states have 
never done: they surrendered their constitutional tax autonomy to the 
central government. As a result, Argentina suffers an extreme vertical 
fiscal imbalance—that is, a highly centralized system of tax collection, 
coupled with highly decentralized spending (and borrowing) 
authority and an extravagantly large system of federal transfers. Over 
sixty percent of provincial budgets consist of federal transfers; in ten 
provinces, the amount is over eighty percent.76 Under a system of 
general revenue sharing, funds reach provincial governments with no 
strings attached. The system, however, has been perennially 
beleaguered; a general reform, though promised in a 1994 
 
 73. JORGE P. GORDIN, INSTITUT BARCELONA D’ESTUDIS INTERNACIONALS, THE 
POLITICS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN ARGENTINA 4 (2006), available at 
http://www.tkp2e-dak.org/Dokumen/kajian/WP_IBEI_2.pdf. 
 74. See generally Carlos Gervasoni, Fiscal Federalism as a Source of Rents (Am. Pol. Sci. 
Ass’n, Meeting Paper, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1450202#%23 (describing fiscal federalism rents, using Argentina as an example); see also 
GORDIN, supra note 73, at 4 (assessing the explanatory power of two different views on 
subnational fiscal relations). 
 75. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
(2010) (arguing that numerous American political institutions and practices produce a culture of 
lawlessness). 
 76. Tommasi et al, supra note 21, at 161. 
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constitutional revision, has never materialized.77 Very often, transfers 
are haggled out in “fiscal pacts” between provincial governments and 
the national executive. Those pacts are driven not so much by 
substantive economic rationality but by political demands and forces, 
such as the executive’s protection of a political-power base and the 
provinces’ bargaining strength.78 
The U.S. Congress is far more assertive vis-à-vis the executive than 
the Argentinian legislature. It seems unlikely that it would consent to 
executive-led fiscal pacts, or that individual states would voluntarily 
lock themselves into global fiscal bargains with the federal 
government (if for no better reason than that there is no single 
federal agency with whom such a deal could be negotiated). 
Unmistakably, however, American federalism has been lurching in the 
direction of executive federalism on a program-by-program basis. 
The principal example, again, is Medicaid. Under this program, 
representing over forty percent of all federal transfer payments to 
state and local governments, the vertical fiscal imbalance—as 
measured by the FMAP—has already reached Argentinian 
proportions. The ACA will further promote that tendency. Moreover, 
the U.S. Congress has deliberately put itself into the position of the 
Argentinian legislature. Under the statute, Congress will write a blank 
check for whatever the federal match for the states’ programs may 
turn out to be. The contours of state programs, in turn, are haggled out 
between a federal bureaucracy endowed with ample discretionary and 
waiver authority and individual states that vary widely with respect to 
both local spending demands and their propensity and ability to game 
the system. 
Further, the ACA couples its massive Medicaid expansion with a 
system of state-run but federally subsidized and superintended 
health-benefit exchanges. These arrangements, too, are largely a 
matter of poorly constrained, individualized federal-state bargains.79 It 
 
 77. Id. at 162. 
 78. Id. at 175–85 (describing the Political-Transactions Theory, which explains features of 
public policies as the outcomes of political transactions). 
 79. See, e.g., Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, Empowering States to Innovate, THE WHITE 
HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 28, 2011, 11:56 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/02/28 
/empowering-states-innovate; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Obama 
Administration Takes New Steps to Support Innovation, Empower States (Mar. 10, 2011), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/03/20110310a.html; Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Secretary Sebelius Announces New Pre-Existing 
Condition Insurance Plan, (July 1, 2010), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/ 
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is no exaggeration to say that healthcare and insurance—a very large 
swath of the U.S. economy and of the business of government—has 
been effectively Argentinianized.80 
B. Pensions 
Unsustainable state and local pension obligations are a central 
issue in Argentina as well as the United States, for substantially 
identical institutional reasons (state or provincial governments’ 
misaligned incentives). As for the United States, it is a foregone 
conclusion that state and local governments’ obligations will not be 
paid in full: they cannot be paid. Forward-looking measures—for 
example, a move from defined-benefit plans to 401(k)-style plans for 
new state and local employees—can delay but not avert the day of 
reckoning, when somebody must cut the existing entitlements and 
abrogate the contractual obligations. The question is how the political 
system will administer the haircut, and to whom. 
One possible U.S. model is the existing Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC), whose member-companies contribute to a 
common fund dedicated to paying the pension obligations owed by 
other, bankrupt companies.81 It is unlikely, however, that responsible 
states and their pension funds would agree to such a scheme; and, 
unlike public companies, they cannot be forced into it as a 
constitutional matter. Moreover, the PBGC’s perilous financial state 
diminishes its attraction.82 
Argentina provides a different, more plausible (although not 
necessarily more attractive) model. First, in 1994, the central 
government rolled the pension programs of eleven provinces—
outstanding obligations, contributions, and all—into a recently 
reformed (but soon-to-be troubled) federal pension system.83 The cost 
of this bailout was initially estimated at $500 billion; the actual cost 
 
2010pres/07/20100701a.html. 
 80. By some indications, K-12 education has begun to conform to the same pattern. See, 
e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., President Obama: Our Children Can’t Wait for 
Congress to Fix No Child Left Behind, Announces Flexibility in Exchange for Reform for Ten 
States, (Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/president-obama-our-
children-cant-wait-congress-fix-no-child-left-behind-announces-flexibility-exchange-reform-ten-
states. 
 81. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1302 (West 2006). 
 82. Dan Kadlec, Pension Backstop Posts Record Shortfall. Is a Bailout Next? TIME 
MONEYLAND (Nov. 17, 2011), available at http://moneyland.time.com/2011/11/17/pension-
backstop-posts-record-shortfall-bailout-next. 
 83. Tommasi et al., supra note 21, at 160. 
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proved three times that amount.84 Second, the government declared 
that the obligations would be payable not (as originally promised) in 
U.S. dollars but in Argentinian pesos. The devaluation amounted to 
roughly thirteen percent of outstanding obligations.85 
Could this happen in the United States? The scheme seems 
needlessly complicated; we could simply peso-ize the U.S. economy 
and inflate state and local debts away along with everyone else’s.86 At 
the same time, a global federalization of state and local pensions 
seems very unlikely. Large groups of state and local employees, such 
as police officers and firefighters, are firmly entrenched at the local 
level, while lacking a federal “go-to” agency that would tend to their 
demands. They will consent to federalization only as a last resort and 
as an alternative to an otherwise certain benefit cut. One can, 
however, imagine an Argentinian solution for other parts of the state 
and local workforce, such as educational personnel and perhaps 
transit workers. Teachers in particular have a muscular presence in 
Washington, D.C., and a federal agency (the U.S. Department of 
Education) that sees to their concerns. Existing statutes, moreover, 
already regulate their workplace entitlements in considerable detail.87 
A quality education for all children, the argument runs, requires 
highly skilled and motivated teachers. Such teachers, though, cannot 
be attracted or retained if their retirement benefits are in perennial 
doubt. Accordingly, the argument continues, states participating in 
federal education programs must either guarantee and fully fund 
those benefits in perpetuity, or opt into a federal pension system. A 
“Teacher Retention Act” along these lines could roll up to nine 
million state and local employees into an Argentinian system.88 It 
would not break with any principle or premise of our federalism. 
 
 84. For a concise description, see Fabio M. Bertranou, Carlos O. Grushka and Rafael 
Rofman, From Reform to Crisis: Argentina’s Pension System, 2 INT’L SOC. SECURITY REV. 103, 
107 (2003). 
 85. Id. at 108. 
 86. Some prominent economists have come to advocate this policy, principally on the 
grounds that no other solution is in sight. See, e.g., Kenneth Rogoff, The Second Great 
Contraction, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Aug. 2, 2011), available at http://www.project-
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VII. REFORM? 
The fundamental fiscal federalism dilemma is between a credible 
central commitment against bailouts and central control over 
subordinate governments’ fiscal affairs. That dilemma marks the state 
of our federalism. On one side, the commitment has been severely 
compromised. On the other side, central fiscal controls have their 
limits—we are not going to see states in de facto receivership, either 
under a bankruptcy judge or, as in Argentina and more recently in 
Europe, under centrally approved and installed emergency 
governments. The United States has resorted to that extra-
constitutional strategy only once, during Reconstruction; it is not 
about to do so again. Too many constitutional, institutional, and 
political obstacles stand in the way. That leaves two scenarios. One is 
an accelerating series of increasingly aggressive bailouts-by-any-
other-name, with increasingly Argentinian overtones and effects. The 
other is a contraction of the transfer state and a step back into a more 
“dual” federalism—that is, a wholesale nationalization of 
“cooperative” federal-state programs, or else a wholesale devolution 
of responsibility, including tax and funding authority, to state and local 
governments. 
The general consensus among experts is that federal systems will 
contemplate reforms of this sort only under extreme conditions and in 
response to severe shocks.89 (In normal times, fiscal federalism’s 
pathological, self-enforcing tendencies will prevail.) As noted earlier, 
our fiscal federalism encountered such a challenge once, under the 
first Reagan Administration. A brief review of that experience 
prompts probing questions about federalism’s current condition and 
likely trajectory. The answers are far from comforting. 
A. Failed Reform 
In the early 1980s, cooperative federalism encountered a twofold 
shock: the Federal Reserve Board’s decision to wring inflation out of 
the economy, which ended the political strategy of redeeming 
promises to state and local governments in cheaper dollars;90 and the 
collapse of a formerly stable political consensus on cooperative 
 
 89. See generally RODDEN, supra note 7, ch. 8 (explaining “why states, under conditions of 
an integrated and highly mobile economy, would opt for the New Deal Constitution’s 
federalism”). 
 90. John J. Wallis, The Political Economy of New Deal Fiscal Federalism, 29 ECON. 
INQUIRY 510, 512–15 (1991). 
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federalism, which prompted an ambitious “New Federalism” initiative 
by the newly elected Reagan Administration.91 The core of this 
initiative was a proposal, based on expert recommendations (mostly 
from the Brookings Institution), to disentangle cooperative 
federalism by means of a welfare “swap”: the federal government 
would assume full funding responsibility for Medicaid and food 
stamps in exchange for the states’ assumption of full responsibility—
including revenue responsibility—for AFDC and other welfare 
programs.92 The swap was carefully calculated to improve the fiscal 
condition of all states, both on a current and prospective basis (as 
Medicaid payments were growing much faster than welfare 
obligations). Its central assumption was that perennial state 
complaints over “unfunded mandates,” onerous grant conditions, and 
deteriorating state finances would translate into state support for 
disentanglement on fiscally advantageous conditions. 
That assumption proved gravely mistaken. Neither state officials 
nor the welfare lobby were remotely prepared to entertain the swap 
proposal, and it was never even introduced in Congress. Confronted 
with the states’ and their clientele’s vehement protests, the Reagan 
Administration abandoned its disentanglement objective and instead 
endeavored to stem the flow of federal money to state and local 
governments—as shown in the graph above, with notable but 
transitory success. Statutory mandates soon proliferated again, and 
transfer payments (especially for Medicaid) resumed their growth. 
B. Better Luck this Time? 
Can one imagine a more successful challenge to cooperative 
federalism under current conditions? Some factors point in that 
direction. For one thing, fiscal federalism has reached the outer limits 
of its plausibility. Its point is to create fiscal illusions. The ACA’s 
match of 100 cents on the dollar, by way of contrast, is not an illusion: 
federal taxes-plus-debt match expenditures. Similarly, state and local 
taxes have been stuck at roughly fifteen percent of gross domestic 
product since the end of the Reagan years, which suggests that 
cooperative federalism may have lost its capacity to spur local tax 
 
 91. TIMOTHY J. CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE 
YEARS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM, 191–211 (1998) (describing regulatory federalism 
under President Reagan). 
 92. Id. at 182. 
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efforts.93 If that is so, cooperative federalism’s further expansion will 
require some combination of yet-more-generous transfers and off-
budget state debt, neither of which seems sustainable. Finally, state 
politicians’ time horizon and incentives may have become more 
closely aligned with the electorate’s sentiments and calculations. Take-
the-money-and-run-for-higher-office is a rational strategy only so long 
as voters remain ignorant of the long-term costs (or discount them at 
fantastic rates). Recent gubernatorial refusals to accept federal funds 
for high-speed train systems suggest that the calculus may have 
changed94—perhaps, because voters suspect that a debt-ridden federal 
government will fail to make good on its commitments. 
Against these considerations stand profound and dispiriting 
changes in American politics. Reagan’s New Federalism reflected a 
broad political consensus (among the electorate, policymakers, and 
experts) that cooperative federalism had failed to work and that 
something could and should be done about it.95 That is no longer so. 
Public distrust of political institutions is running at record levels, but 
the cynicism has not translated into any coherent agenda. We seem to 
take it for granted that our institutions will fail us.96 At the same time, 
broad dissatisfaction with cooperative federalism has given way to 
bipartisan support. Democrats recognize, more keenly than three 
decades ago, that the transfer state is the party’s backbone—it 
sustains both the recipients and, more importantly, the (unionized) 
distributors of federal-state largesse. Republicans, for their part, have 
gotten much dumber. The GOP’s federalism Plan B, after the failure 
of the Reagan agenda, was “devolution”—that is, the reconfiguration 
of cooperative transfer programs on terms that are more acceptable 
to state officials.97 The supposed crown jewel of that agenda is the 
1996 welfare reform,98 which granted states vastly increased discretion 
 
 93. See GREVE, supra note 39, at 273 (including a graph showing state and local own source 
revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product). 
 94. See, e.g., Vauhini Vara, California Train Plan Hits Bump Over Funds, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
4, 2011, at A2. 
 95. CONLAN, supra note 91, at 141–43. 
 96. For evidence of this growing cynicism and distrust of government, see AM. ENTER. 
INST., HOW DO AMERICANS FEEL ABOUT THEIR GOVERNMENT? AN AEI PUBLIC OPINION 
REPORT (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.aei.org/press/politics-and-public-opinion/polls/ 
how-do-americans-feel-about-their-government-an-aei-public-opinion-report. 
 97. For brief discussion and references, see Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative 
Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 582 (2000). 
 98. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-193. 
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in configuring their welfare systems. The notion that this reform 
constitutes a plausible conservative federalism model is nine parts 
self-delusion and one part snake oil. States converted formerly 
mandatory cash payments to welfare recipients into wages for state 
bureaucrats who run education programs, pregnancy management, 
drug rehabilitation, and other “workfare” requirements.99 At the same 
time, federal cash transfers and their equivalents exploded under 
programs outside welfare (such as food stamps and housing 
subsidies), to the point where welfare is often preferable to work.100 
Any block grant will increase the potential for similar opportunistic 
state behavior. Even so, the devolution agenda still unites 
Republicans from the Tea Party to Mitt Romney supporters, and the 
will to rethink that agenda is nil. Thus, our polarized politics 
converges on a 1960s-ish consensus: cooperative federalism has not 
failed. It has never been tried. 
Things that cannot go on, the late Herbert Stein remarked, will 
eventually end.101 Our federalism cannot go on. Eventually, the debts 
will hit home. Eventually, the dollar will lose in the currency markets’ 
ugly dog contest. Eventually, one hopes, American government and 
federalism will revert to constitutional roots. However, Professor 
Stein’s sagacious pronouncement is of doubtful relevance to the 
conduct of political affairs. As Thomas Hobbes taught, the fear of 
death never prompts individual action: death is certain, and fear of it 
is a constant. People learn to live with it and with the loss of vitality 
along the way. What sparks action is fear of a sudden and violent 
death.102 The same may be true of political systems, including our 
federalism. It faces no imminent collapse; and because it does not, it 
may be destined for an Argentinian fate. 
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